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CAN RELIGIOUS UNBELIEF BE PROPER 
FUNCTION RATIONAL? 
Michael Czapkay Sudduth 
This paper presents a critical analysis of Alvin Plantinga's recent contention, 
developed in Warranted Christian Beli'i (forthcoming), that if theism is true, 
then it is unlikely that religious unbelief is the product of properly functioning, 
truth-aimed cognitive faculties. More specifically, Plantinga argues that, given 
his own model of properly basic theistic belief, religious unbelief would 
always depend on cognitive malfunction somewhere in a person's noetic estab-
lishment. I argue that this claim is highly questionable and has adverse conse-
quences for Plantinga's epistemology of religious belief. Plantinga's proper 
basicality thesis together with his view of rationality defeaters suggests that 
there are circumstances in which theistic belief would not be proper function 
rational even if theism is true. 
I. Introduction 
In Warrant and Proper Function Ah'in Plantinga argued that a belief has 
warrant, roughly, just if it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning 
properly in a congenial environment according to a design plan success-
fully aimed at truth. In chapter 6 of Warranted Christian Belief (hereafter 
WCB) Plantinga draws on Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin to present a 
model of how theistic belief can have warrant in a basic way (i.e., with-
out propositional evidence). Plantinga seems to affirm the following 
proposition, a more recent variant of his earlier proper basicality thesis: 
[PI] There are circumstances C such that, given any human person 
S, if S is in C and S's (relevant) truth-aimed cognitive faculties are 
functioning properly, then S holds a firm basic theistic belief.l 
By "circumstances" I will understand any of the many widely real-
ized experiential conditions that Plantinga points out in chapter 6 of 
WCB, things like the starry night sky, the crashing waves of the ocean, 
the majestic grandeur of the Vermont Mountains, and the lovely melody 
of a Bach Concerto. Plantinga maintains that these sorts of circumstances 
trigger the formation of various kinds of theistic beliefs: God is present, 
is powerful, is forgiving, etc. (all of which self-evidently entail God 
exists). By "relevant" cognitive faculties I refer to Calvin's sensus divini-
tatis, which Plantinga takes to be a natural faculty or mechanism that is 
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responsible for producing various theistic beliefs. More specifically, "the 
sensus divinitatis is a disposition or set of dispositions to form theistic 
beliefs in various circumstances, in response to the sorts of conditions or 
stimuli that trigger the working of this sense of divinity" (WCBM*' chap-
ter 6).2 The experiential circumstances, of course, are not evidences that 
are taken as premises from which theistic beliefs are derived by a 
process of inference. The circumstances are simply occasions that trigger 
the formation of theistic belief, so theistic belief is basic (i.e., not held on 
the evidential basis of other beliefs). Plantinga further thinks that when 
the sensus divinitatis is functioning properly we will hold a firm theistic 
belief. More precisely, if a person's (relevant) cognitive faculties are 
functioning properly and she is in any of the widely realized experien-
tial circumstances (specified by the design plan), she will firmly hold 
some theistic belief. 
Plantinga also claims in chapter 6 that if theism is true then [PI] or 
something close to it is likely to be a true epistemological proposition. 
(He would also add that there are in fact some people who find them-
selves in the relevant circumstances and whose relevant cognitive facul-
ties are functioning properly, and thus who hold a firm basic belief in 
God). Plantinga presents the argument as follows. If one thinks of 
humans as created by God, one will not think of theistic belief as the 
product of belief forming processes aimed at something other than truth, 
much less as the product of some intellectual defect. if God exists and 
has created human persons in His image for the purpose of entering into 
communion with Him, then it is natural to think that God desires us to 
hold true beliefs about Him and our duties to Him. So He would proba-
bly create us in such a way that we can achieve this cognitive goal. This 
seems likely if theism is true. But then it is also likely that the faculties 
that produce theistic belief have been aimed at this end by their design-
er. In that case, theistic belief is the product of cognitive faculties func-
tioning properly according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth. 
Plantinga's notion of proper function rationality (hereafter PF-ratio-
nality) raises an interesting question: Can religious unbeliefbe PF-ratio-
na17 (By "religious unbelief" I will understand, unless otherwise noted, 
either withholding theistic belief or believing the negation of theism). 
Plantinga thinks that if we do not assume a theistic metaphysics, an 
affirmative answer could be given to this question. If Plantinga is right 
about this a more interesting question would be whether religious unbe-
lief could be PF-rational if theism is true. Plantinga argues that it cannot, 
at least given his model of proper basicality. "Unbelief," he says, "is a 
result of dysfunction, or brokenness, failure to function properly, or 
impedance of rational faculties" (WCBM*' chapter 6). Plantinga presents 
some very interesting arguments for This claim in chapter 14 of WCB. 
However, r think the arguments are deeply problematic and entail sig-
nificant difficulties for some of Plantinga's other important claims in 
religious epistemology. To see this I begin by developing a case for the 
PF-rationality of religious unbelief given some of Plantinga's own epis-
temological principles. 
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II. A Case for the Proper Function Rationality of Religious Unbelief 
A necessary condition of warrant is the proper functioning of one's 
cognitive equipment. Fundamental to proper function is the cognitive 
design plan - a set of blue prints or specifications for a well-formed, 
properly functioning human cognitive system. Since the kind of specifi-
cations relevant for warrant are truth-oriented, they are specifications 
for that segment of the cognitive design plan that has as its purpose the 
production of true beliefs (as opposed to non-alethic purposes, such as 
survival or relief from suffering). The design plan specifies what the 
appropriate doxastic response of our cognitive faculties should be in a 
wide range of circumstances to achieve this alethic goal in a reliable 
manner.3 
The design plan for humans also includes what Plantinga calls a 
defeater system, a cognitive subsystem that is designed to regulate modifi-
cations in a person's noetic structure given new experiences and the 
acquisition of new beliefs which come with social exposure, mental mat-
uration, and education. In short, these are specifications as to the correct 
or proper ways of changing beliefs in response to experience (doxastic 
and otherwise). Generally, if a person acquires a defeater for a belief B, 
then there ought to be a certain kind of revision in the person's noetic 
structure. In some cases the person ought not to hold B with the same 
degree of firmness (partial defeat). In other cases the proper response is 
not to hold B at all (complete defeat). Defeaters, partial or complete, may 
be reasons for no longer holding B (i.e., undercutters) or reasons for 
holding a belief incompatible with B (i.e., rebutters). (Although 
Plantinga has elsewhere taken defeaters to include non-doxastic experi-
ences, I will confine myself in this paper to defeaters construed as other 
beliefs of a person). A belief D is a defeater for a belief B of some person 
S just if, given S's noetic structure, S cannot rationally hold B (at least to 
some degree) given that S also holds D: 
Plantinga cites a couple of examples of defeaters. I see in the distance 
what appears to be a sheep in the field and form the belief that there is a 
sheep in the field. The next day someone comes along whom I know is 
the owner of the field and he tells me that there are no sheep in the field. 
I have acquired, via testimony, a rebutting defeater for the belief that 
there was a sheep in the field because I have acquired a reason for sup-
posing that there was no sheep in the field. But there are also undercut-
ting defeaters. A person enters a factory and sees an assembly line on 
which there are a number of widgets. These appear red. Being appeared 
to red-widgetly, the person forms the belief that there are red widgets on 
the assembly line. The shop superintendent then informs the person that 
the widgets are being irradiated by an infra red light, thereby enabling 
the detection of otherwise undetectable hairline cracks. Here the person 
merely loses his reason for supposing that the widgets are red. Both of 
these cases presents us with a person (i) who holds some belief B at time 
tI, (ii) whose noetic structure undergoes modification with respect to B 
at time t2 after it comes to include the additional belief D, and (iii) 
whose relevant cognitive faculties (we correctly judge) are functioning 
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properly at t1 through t2.5 
Since the defeater system is aimed at the production and sustenance 
of true beliefs, it forms an essential thread in the array of our rational 
cognitive faculties. The proper function requirement for warrant, then, 
extends to the proper functioning one's defeater system, what we might 
call defeater-system PF-rationality. A person S's belief B is warranted 
only if Sis PF-rational in holding B (to the degree that S does). And S is 
PF-rational in holding B (to the degree that S does) only if the relevant 
portions of S's defeater system are functioning properly and free from 
impedance, functioning such that the appropriate revisions take place 
with the acquisition of any defeaters against B.6 If there was no noetic 
modification in the above cases, then the person's cognitive state would 
not be PF-rational. Consequently, the belief B in each case would lack 
warrant (to some degree). 
So Plantinga holds to what we can call the rationality defeater principle: 
[OP] Given any person S and any belief B, if S acquires a(n) (unde-
feated) defeater 0 for B, then S is no longer rational in holding B (at 
least not with the same degree of firmness).7 
It follows from [OP] that if a person acquired a(n) (undefeated) 
defeater for theistic belief, then holding theistic belief (or doing so firm-
ly) would be PF-irrational and not holding theistic belief (or not doing so 
firmly) would be PF-rational. 
Consider a case not too far removed from one that Plantinga himself 
introduces.' Lisa has been raised in a Christian family. During her youth 
she holds her theistic belief in a basic way, but in her later teenage years 
her theistic belief isn't as strong. The cares of college life, sexual indul-
gence, and late-night parties slowly erode her thoughts of God. While a 
senior in college, she is exposed to Sigmund Freud's idea of wish fulfill-
ment. She becomes convinced that the belief she had in an invisible 
friend called Merlin while a young girl was one such belief. Upon fur-
ther reflection, though, she sees that her belief in God is significantly 
analogous to the belief she once had in the invisible Merlin. So she 
comes to believe that (p) her belief in God is really the product of wish 
fulfillment, a convenient defense mechanism against the hostile forces of 
one's environment. Her readings in Freud confirm this. Moreover, she 
also believes that (q) the objective probability of a belief being true given 
that it is produced by wish fulfillment is either low or inscrutable. (I say 
"or inscrutable" here because perhaps she is simply agnostic about the 
probability of a belief being true given that it was produced by wish ful-
fillment, rather than estimating that probability to be low). She then 
believes that the objective probability of her theistic belief being true is 
either low or inscrutable. Lisa has acquired an undercutting defeater for 
her theistic belief. If her defeater is partial and itself undefeated (as 
might be the case if she didn't hold either p or q very firmly), then the 
rational thing to do would be to hold her theistic belief less firmly than 
she did before acquiring this defeater. Perhaps her defeater is complete 
and itself undefeated (e.g., she has great enthusiasm for projective theo-
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ries of religious belief or alternatively her theistic belief is very weak 
before encountering p and q), then if she is PF-rational she will no 
longer hold her theistic belief at alP 
Then there is Elvis' problem of evil. Elvis is a very devout believer in 
God raised in an Assembly of God Church in Tupelo, Mississippi. While 
in the Army, Elvis' mother Gladys dies of a heart attack. As a result, 
Elvis loses his faith. He reasons thus: (A) if there is a God, then God 
would not permit my mother to die unless he had a good reason for 
doing so, (B) my mother is dead and God had no reason for permitting 
her to die, therefore (C) there is no God. Elvis has acquired a rebutting 
defeater. If Elvis holds (A) and (B) very firmly and sees the deductive 
entailment (C), then Elvis probably has a complete rebutting defeater for 
his theistic belief. The rational thing to do is no longer hold theistic belief 
(maybe even hold the negation of theism). If he continued to hold his 
theistic belief, even in a less than firm manner, he would not be PF-ratio-
nal. On the other hand, it is possible that Elvis does not hold the second 
conjunct of (B) very firmly and so in fact has simply acquired a partial 
defeater. The rational thing to do is no longer hold his theistic belief 
with the same degree of firmness. If Elvis continued to hold his theistic 
belief with the same degree of firmness, that belief would not be PF-
rational. Since PF-rationality is necessary for warrant, Elvis' theistic 
belief would not be warranted. And since warrant is necessary for 
knowledge, Elvis would not know that God exists. 
It is important to point out that the argument here for the PF-rational-
ity of religious unbelief is logically consistent with [PI]. What follows 
from [PI] is that if a person is in the relevant circumstances and does not 
hold a firm theistic belief, holds no theistic belief, or believes the nega-
tion of theism, he suffers from some cognitive malfunction, or perhaps 
his cognitive state has been produced by something other than truth-
aimed cognitive faculties. In addition to circumstances C (that call for 
firm theistic belief), there are plausibly circumstances C* which include 
having an undefeated defeater for theistic belief. Here, depending on the 
actual defeater, the appropriate doxastic response for a reasonable per-
son will be withholding theistic belief, holding the negation of theism, or 
merely holding a less than firm theistic belief. The relevant analogy here 
can be taken from the conditions that govern the PF-rationality of senso-
ry perceptual, testimonial, and memorial beliefs. If a circumstance 
includes being appeared to rainly, then I am PF-rational in holding the 
belief that it is raining outside, unless of course the relevant circum-
stance includes my having defeaters for such beliefs. So even if [PI] is 
likely if theism is true, it would not follow that it is likely that religious 
unbelief is PF-irrational if theism is true. This point is significant and I 
will return to it in section IV. 
III. Degrees of Rationality and Irrationality Transference 
Although Plantinga allows for the possibility that Lisa and Elvis each 
acquires a defeater for theistic belief, he maintains that the cognitive state 
of religious unbelief is not therefore PF-rational. lO,ll Plantinga claims that 
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if a person has a defeater for theistic belief it is because there is malfunc-
tion elsewhere in the person's cognitive system. This is developed in 
chapter 14 of WCB. Plantinga's main contention here is that if a person 
acquired a defeater for theistic belief, then there would have to be cogni-
tive malfunction elsewhere in the person's cognitive system, most likely 
in the sensus divinitl7tis itself. With reference to the problem of evil as a 
defeater for theistic belief, Plantinga writes: "What it is important to see, 
here, is that if she does have a defeater, it is only because of a failure of 
rationality somewhere in her noetic structure (perhaps there is dysfunc-
tion with respect to the sensus divinitatis)" (WCBM*, ch. 14). 
I think we can provide an initial formulationm Plantinga's argument 
here by laying down what appears to be the argument's two main 
premises: 
[P2] Given any fallen person S(f), if S(f) acquires a defeater D for 
some theistic belief T, then S(f)'s acquiring D depends on cognitive 
malfunction in another relevant cognitive module. 
[P3] Given any fallen person S(f), if S(f)'s acquiring a defeater D for 
some theistic belief T depends on cognitive malfunction in another 
relevant cognitive module, then the cognitive state of religious 
unbelief is not PF-rational. 
Let's begin by addressing the clause "S(f)'s acquiring D depends on 
cognitive malfunction in another relevant cognitive module." One way 
of unpacking these premises is to parse this clause in terms of "irrational 
input to the defeater system." Plantinga does not explicitly state this, but 
I think it is a plausible way of thinking of the notion of a defeater's 
depending on cognitive malfunction. In other words, defeating reasons 
may include a belief that was produced by a malfunctioning cognitive 
faculty. If we go this route, Plantinga's argument would involve some-
thing like an irrationality transference principle, according to which irra-
tionality is transferred from an irrational defeating reason to the cogni-
tive state based on it. If belief B is based on belief A, and A is PF-irra-
tional, then B is PF-irrational. The PF-rationality of a cognitive state 
based on defeaters would then require that defeating reasons not be pro-
duced by any defective faculties. Religious unbelief then would be PF-
irrational because defeaters for it in some way take as input beliefs that 
have been produced by some dysfunctional faculty. 
Two important distinctions need to be made here. First, we need to 
distinguish between the cognitive state of religious unbelief and the 
defeater that is in some way responsible for that cognitive state. We can 
evaluate each in terms of PF-rationality. Secondly, we need to distin-
guish different degrees of PF-rationality based on something like depth of 
rationality ingression. In a foundationalist scheme beliefs have different 
degrees of depth of ingression depending on where they are located 
within a person's noetic structure (specifically, how close they are to the 
foundations and how much of the doxastic content of the superstructure 
depends on them). Similarly, we can say that there is a depth of ingres-
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sion with respect to the PF-rationality of beliefs, and that this is a deter-
minant, maybe the primary determinant, of the degree of PF-rationality 
of a cognitive state. Suppose that a malfunction in some cognitive facul-
ty f1 produces some belief p that, together with a belief q produced by a 
properly function faculty f2, functions as input to the defeater system. 
Suppose further that, given these conditions, if the defeater system is 
functioning properly it would produce the belief r. The suggestion is 
that the cognitive state <belief that r> is PF-rational to some degree, and 
its degree of PF-rationality is greater than the degree of PF-rationality 
for the cognitive state <belief that p>. The latter is directly produced by 
cognitive malfunction and has what we might call a zeroeth degree of 
PF-rationality ingression. The former is the product of some properly 
functioning faculties (two to be exact), though it also includes an irra-
tional belief as input to the defeater system. It has a degree of PF-ratio-
nality ingression greater than zero, but not maximal. A maximally PF-
rational cognitive state would be one that is produced solely by truth 
aimed, properly functioning cognitive faculties and - if nonbasic - is 
located on an inferential path which has no irrational beliefs. 
It would seem, then, that the irrationality transference principle is 
mistaken. Religious unbelief might have a degree of PF-rationality 
ingression greater than zero, even if the defeating reasons producing it 
do not. We can plausibly read Elvis and Lisa's cognitive states of reli-
gious unbelief at least as instances of less than maximal PF-rationality. 
In fact, one might argue that their defeaters are maximally rational." But 
the important point is that even if the defeaters were less than maximal-
ly rational, they would still be epistemically significant. Plantinga him-
self seems to concur, for he admits in his unpublished "Naturalism 
Defeated" and in WCB (chapter 11) that an irrational belief can function 
as a rationality defeater. Suppose I believe that all cats are benign crea-
tures, but then due to some rare feline phobia I come to believe that my 
cat Salem crawls to my face at night with the intention of suffocating me 
(and that perhaps he conspires in this with other neighborhood cats). 
According to Plantinga, I thereby acquire a rationality defeater for my 
previous belief that all cats are kind and benign creatures, even though 
the defeating reasons have a zeroeth degree of PF-rationality ingression, 
with the malfunction occurring in another relevant cognitive module. As 
a result of acquiring this defeater, not only is my previous optimistic 
feline belief no longer rational but that belief no longer has warrant (at 
least not to the same degree). 
This suggests that a particular doxastic state can be epistemically sig-
nificant and PF-rational even if that doxastic state supervenes on cogni-
tive malfunction by way of irrational input to the defeater system. In the 
above case, is my doxastic state maximally rational? No. The input to the 
defeater system includes beliefs that were produced by cognitive mal-
function. In fact, the belief has little if anything in the way of warrant. 
Something is wrong with me, but if I continued to hold my optimistic 
feline belief two things would be wrong with me, as my failure to modify 
my optimistic feline belief indicates a second cognitive defect (related to 
the proper functioning of my defeater system). So it seems that the 
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human design plan at least sometimes specifies that withholding belief 
(or holding a belief less firmly) is called for even when this depends on 
dysfunction somewhere else in one's cognitive system. Since a belief can 
lose warrant if a person acquires a defeater for it, an irrational belief can 
defeat warrant as well. So nothing in principle robs a cognitive state of 
epistemic significance just because it was produced by cognitive 
processes that include a less than maximally rational defeater. Of course, 
it does not necessarily follow that the same thing is true for theistic 
belief. But on what grounds can we affirm this of other beliefs and deny 
it for theistic belief in particular without the appearance of arbitrary 
epistemic partiality? 
IV. Proper Basicality, Relevant Analogs, and Rationality Defeaters 
Well, perhaps we have moved too quickly. I have been assuming that 
Plantinga's argument for the irrationality of religious unbelief depends 
on a claim about irrational input to the defeater system, where that irra-
tionality is allegedly transferred to the cognitive state of religious unbe-
lief. But parsing lP2] and lP3] in this way is not the only way to go. We 
might simply understand a defeater's depending on malfunction in 
another relevant cognitive module to refer to the malfunctioning of a cog-
nitive faculty that is designed to produce theistic belief. On this way of 
looking at things, Plantinga could affirm the possibility of maximally 
rational defeaters for theistic belief but still deny that religious unbelief is 
PF-rational. Plantinga could respond that even if Elvis or Lisa each has a 
maximally rational defeater for theistic belief, the fact that they end up in 
a state of religious unbelief shows us that sometliing is wrong. He claims 
that this points to a malfunctioning ficnsus divinitatis. Planting a writes: 
"On the extended A/C model, the scnsus divinitatis is among our cogni-
tive faculties or processes; if it is functioning properly in S, then the belief 
that there is such a person as God will automatically have warrant for" 
(WCBM*, chapter 14). Again he writes of the sensus divinitatis: "Someone 
in whom this process was functioning properly would have an intimate, 
detailed, vivid and explicit knowledge of God .... but the idea that per-
haps there just wasn't any such person as God would no doubt not so 
much as cross her mind" (WCBM*, chapter 14). So the irrationality of 
religious unbelief is not due to irrational input to the defeater system, but 
the malfunctioning of a faculty designed to produce theistic belief. 
Plantinga then seems to be affirming the following proposition (as an 
entailment of [P2]): 
[P4] Given any fallen human person S(f), S(f) has some cogni-
tive faculty F (i.e., the senslIs divinitatis), such that if F is 
functioning properly, S(f) holds a firm theistic belief T. 
It follows from [P4] that Elvis's holding a less than firm belief that T, 
or failing to hold T altogether, is an indication of cognitive malfunction 
(or impedance), even if Elvis has a defeater for T. Elvis acquires a defeater 
for theistic belief, at least in part, because the scnsus divinitatis (hereafter 
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SD) is malfunctioning, not because another faculty produces an irrational 
belief that forms part of the defeater. If the SD were functioning proper-
ly, then a person would probably not acquire a defeater for theistic belief 
in the first place (and if he did, he would have a defeater-defeater for this 
defeater in the form of the output of the SD). On the other hand, if the SD 
is damaged or non-operational, a person might not have a firm belief in 
God, thereby rendering him susceptible to acquiring a defeater for theis-
tic belief and moving further into religious unbelief. 
Plantinga has offered two analogies to support this position. 13 First, 
suppose that a student acquires a good argument for believing that he 
no longer exists, say under the influence of his persuasive philosophy 
professor. Would giving up his belief in his own existence be rational? 
No, Plantinga says, not at all. Secondly, suppose a woman comes to 
believe that her cognitive faculties are unreliable because she thinks she 
has contracted mad-cow disease. According to Plantinga she has a ratio-
nality defeater for all her beliefs since she has a reason for supposing 
that her cognitive faculties are not reliable. Perhaps the defeater is even 
a maximally rational one (i.e., does not depend on irratonal input to the 
defeater system). If we traced its path through the women's noetic struc-
ture we would not find a defective segment anywhere in route to the 
foundations. But Plantinga affirms that proper function would not 
require that she give up all her beliefs. "That way lies sheer madness." I 
take Plantinga's point here to be that the design plan does not stipulate 
universal doxastic abstention under any circumstances. So no matter 
what reasons a person acquired for thinking that her faculties were not 
reliable, she ought not to give up all her beliefs. (Of course, since 
Plantinga construes "having a defeater in some circumstance" as deter-
mined by the design plan, if the design plan doesn't make provision for 
withholding all beliefs under any circumstance, it would seem that the 
woman can't even get a defeater for all her beliefs). Plantinga would 
have us regard a cognitive state of religious unbelief in the presence of 
defeaters as analogous to universal doxastic abstention in the presence 
of a defeater for the reliability of our cognitive faculties. If the latter is 
not a PF-rational cognitive state, neither is the former. As universal dox-
astic abstention, or no longer believing in one's own existence, is not PF-
rational given the acquisition of any set of defeating reasons, so also reli-
gious unbelief is not PF-rational given the acquisition of any set of 
defeating reasons for theistic belief. 
The argument against the PF-rationality of religious unbelief comes 
down to the plausibility of [P4], and this question in turn depends on the 
extent to which [P4] can draw support from the kind of analogies that 
Plantinga presents. As I see it, there are problems here. The most serious 
problem is that [P4], and the supporting analogical argument, entails a 
significantly different formulation of the proper basicality thesis than the 
one Plantinga endorses elsewhere. For instance, in chapter 6 of WCB, 
when Plantinga lays out the model for warranted basic theistic belief, 
the proper functioning of the SD is always associated with or qualified 
by a definite range of experiential input, in a way analogous to the for-
mation of sensory perceptual beliefs. 
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Plantinga writes: 
There is a kind of faculty or cognitive mechanism ... which in a 
wide variety of circumstances produces in us beliefs about God ... 
. Under these circumstances ... these beliefs are formed in us .... The 
sensus divinitatis is a disposition or set of dispositions to form theis-
tic beliefs in various circumstances, in response to the sorts of con-
ditions or stimuli that trigger the workings of this sense of divinti-
ty .... According to the model, therefore, there are many circum-
stances, and circumstances of manv different kinds, that call forth 
or occasion theistic belief. Here the sensus divinitatis resembles 
other belief-producing faculties or mechanisms. If we wish to think 
in terms of the overworked functional analogy, we can think of the 
sensus divinitatis too as an input-output device: it takes the circum-
stances mentioned above as input and issues output theistic beliefs, 
beliefs about God" (WCBM*' chapter 6). 
But the formulation that emerges in the discussion on defeaters omits 
the circumstance relative nature of the theistic belief-forming process 
and its dependence on certain experiential input that triggers theistic 
belief. This is no minor variation. The earlier view, formulated in [PI], is 
logically consistent with a person's SD functioning properly and the per-
son not holding theistic belief (or not holding it firmly), for in [PI] the 
proper functioning of the SD is contextually situated in a limited range 
of circumstances. Plantinga's argument for the dependence of defeaters 
on SO malfunction and the irrationality of religious unbelief seems to 
depend in a most crucial wayan [P4]. But it follows from [P4] that reli-
gious unbelief is PF-irrational and theistic belief PF-rational in any cir-
cumstance, not just those referred to in [PI]. Although Plantinga is cer-
tainly free to develop his own epistemological model for warranted the-
istic belief, the problem is that in fact he has two different models, [PI] 
and [P4]. The first is consistent with the PF-rationality of religious unbe-
lief in some circumstances; the second is not. 
Can't Plantinga just drop [PI] and assert [P4]? Well, he certainly 
could, but should he? The likelihood of [PI] given the truth of theism is 
itself controversial, as it is not clear how the truth of theism makes it 
likely that we should hold theistic belief in a basic (as opposed to nonba-
sic) way. [P4] would be even more controversial. It would require 
affirming that God not only wants us to have true beliefs about him that 
are formed in a basic way, but that it is likely that he wants us to have 
basic beliefs about him (or at least his existence) that could not be subject 
to defeat, except on the condition of irrationality. 
More importantly, Plantinga's taking [P4] as the model will really 
depend on the extent to which Plantinga wants to draw crucial analogies 
between theistic belief and certain other paradigmatic properly basic 
beliefs. For instance, when it comes to defending basic theistic belief 
against the charge of fideism (in chapter 10 of WCB), Plantinga is quick 
to establish the similarity between basic theistic belief and other basic 
beliefs that are not immune to defeat just because they are basic. 
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Plantinga says: "Theistic belief would certainly not be immune to argu-
ment and defeat just by virtue of being basic. In this, theistic belief only 
resembles other kinds of beliefs accepted in the basic way" (WCBM *, 
chapter 10). His three examples are beliefs accepted on testimony, senso-
ry perceptual beliefs, and Gottlob Frege's belief that for every property 
or condition, there exists the set of just those things. Plantinga seems to 
be saying that the design plan for basic theistic belief is similar to the 
design plan for some other basic beliefs in that they share the property 
of being susceptible to defeat, and defeat without irrationality anywhere 
else in one's cognitive system. 14 
This tells us something important about the faculty responsible for 
theistic belief, or at least how Planting a is thinking of it. In the case of 
sensory perceptual beliefs, the relevant cognitive module responsible for 
the formation of such beliefs is designed to function properly and yield 
certain beliefs as output given certain experiential input and given the 
exclusion of sufficient reasons to the contrary. Upon being appeared to 
rainly, I form the belief that it is raining outside. If the relevant portions 
of my cognitive system are functioning properly, then I will hold the 
belief that it is raining outside. But note, my failure to believe it is rain-
ing outside is not by itself an indication of cognitive malfunction. I 
might not be in the relevant circumstance that is specified by the design 
plan (i.e., being appeared to rainly). Alternatively, perhaps the circum-
stance I am in includes being appeared to rainly as well as reasons for 
supposing either that this belief is false or that its ground is inadequate. 
Take the situation where I hear "pitter-patter, trickle, trickle, drip, drip" 
coming from outside and I see drops of water hitting against my kitchen 
window. I form the belief it is raining outside. But then a friend of mine 
comes in (perhaps drenched with water) and tells me that there's some 
crazy old man outside who's spraying water everywhere (and I have no 
reason to believe that my friend is lying to me). So I no longer believe 
that it is raining outside. Is there any cognitive malfunction here? No. 
My holding a less than firm belief that it is raining outside is compatible 
with the proper functioning of the cognitive faculties which produced 
that belief in me in the first place. In fact, I would be PF-rational in with-
holding the belief even if it was raining outside (perhaps the old man 
always sprays water on people when it is raining outside). And the same 
argument could be made for testimonial beliefs and the Frege example.15 
Now Plantinga is surely correct about one thing. It does seem reason-
able to suppose that the design plan rules out some cognitive states as 
PF-rational, even if the state is grounded, allegedly at any rate, in a 
defeater. Plantinga's two examples are appropriate candidates here. But 
we can dig deeper. One of the modules of our cognitive establishment is 
responsible for what we might broadly call self-knowledge. It produces 
beliefs like "I exist" and a broad range of introspective beliefs about one's 
current states of consciousness (e.g., I am in pain, I am being appeared to 
redly). It is widely held, though not beyond controversy, that such beliefs 
possess certain epistemic immunities: immunity from doubt (indubitabil-
ity), error (infallibility), or revision (incorrigibility). The concept of defeat 
only seems appropriate when beliefs do not have such properties. The 
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notion that such beliefs involve some kind of privileged epistemic access 
makes it difficult to see how a person could acquire a defeater for them 
and actually come to doubt them without us supposing that something 
has gone terribly wrong with the person. In the case of my believing that 
I'm being appeared to redly, the self-presenting doxastic state is pro-
duced from the input <being appeared to redly>. If the faculty (or sub-
faculties) responsible for introspective beliefs is functioning properly 
then whenever we have the corresponding experiential input, then we 
hold the belief that we are being appeared to a certain way. Unlike the 
case of a sensory perceptual belief (e.g., it is raining outside), there are no 
circumstances that could include the relevant experiential input to the 
belief forming mechanism without yielding the relevant introspective 
belief, at least not without malfunction somewhere. Even if a person 
acquired apparent defeating reasons for the introspective belief, she 
would (if rational) continue to hold this belief with the same degree of 
firmness. In the case of belief in my own existence, it is reasonable to sup-
pose that if my cognitive faculties are functioning properly then I will 
never withhold the belief or hold its negation. 
This can also help us think about Plantinga's woman who doubts the 
reliability of her cognitive faculties because she thinks she has contract-
ed mad cow disease. What exactly happens here? The woman acquires 
reasons for supposing that her cognitive faculties are unreliable. But the 
woman must assume that some of her cognitive faculties are reliable if 
she has any reason for supposing that her cognitive faculties are not reli-
able. Well, perhaps the woman does not consciously assume this, but it 
certainly seems presupposed in a significant sense by her having a 
defeater in this situation and recognizing it. Without at least an implicit 
commitment to or belief in the reliability of at least some of her cognitive 
processes, specifically the ones responsible for producing her alleged 
defeating reasons, she really has no good reason for supposing that her 
cognitive faculties are unreliable. We could then handle this counterex-
ample by saying that the design plan for our cognitive establishment 
precludes as instances of proper function all cognitive processes that 
involve this kind of self-referential incoherence or self-defeat, as it runs 
contrary to the truth goal of the cognitive design plan. Perhaps we can 
generalize a bit and say that if the holding of any apparently defeating 
reasons D for some belief B entails the holding of the defeatee, then D 
cannot be a defeater for B. Suppose, though, that a person believed that 
<if God does not exist, then one's cognitive faculties are not reliable>. If 
one acquired a rebutting defeater for God's existence, then one would 
probably be in a similar circumstance as the woman above. Here the 
holding of one's defeating reasons would be inconsistent with withhold-
ing the defeatee. But this is obviously a special case and would not be 
true of just any defeater for theistic belief. 
It is reasonable to suppose that some of the faculties of our noetic 
establishment are such that if we are in some circumstance (such as 
being appeared to a certain way), then nothing could be added to the 
circumstance (in the way of reasons to the contrary) to make withhold-
ing the corresponding belief PF-rational. Similarly, there are faculties 
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that, if functioning properly, preclude the withholding of certain 
belief(s) under any circumstances. We might suppose that in both of 
these cases the original belief is actually a defeater against any potential 
defeater. If a philosophy professor gives me a good argument for the 
proposition that I do not exist, it would seem that my belief that I do 
exist (held firmly and PF-rational) has so much more by way of warrant 
that it could simply crush such an argument. I have no reason to take the 
argument seriously at all. Also, there will be certain alleged defeating 
reasons for some beliefs (like belief in the reliability of our cognitive fac-
ulties) that implicitly involve a commitment to the truth of the defeatee. 
It would not be rational to withhold belief in such cases. 
Operating inductively from these cases I think we can frame criteria 
for the kinds of beliefs that cannot be withheld without supposing that 
the faculty that produces them is malfunctioning. Since Plantinga has 
elsewhere suggested such an approach to understand what beliefs are 
properly basic, it would be reasonable to take such an approach in try-
ing to determine what doxastic withholdings can be PF-rational and 
which not. First, these would be beliefs that have epistemic immunities 
that render the notion of defeat logically inapplicable to them. Secondly, 
there will be doxastic states that are self-referentially incoherent or 
where the grounds for withholding belief presupposes a person's com-
mitment to the truth of the defeatee. Perhaps further examples could be 
draw from the cognitive modules responsible for our belief in some a 
priori propositions (e.g., analytically true propositions) and all doxastic 
withholdings in the case inconsistent propositions (that we see to be 
inconsistent at any rate). But theistic belief really doesn't satisfy these 
criteria. So a person's acquiring defeaters for theistic belief can be PF-
rational since theistic belief does not share the necessary properties that 
would make it immune to rationality defeat. 
v. Conclusion 
Warranted Christian Belief presents some strong claims about the irra-
tionality of religious unbelief, based on the truth of theism and 
Plantinga's model of properly basic theistic belief. Plantinga claims that 
if theism is true, then his proper basicality model (or something close to 
it) is likely to be true. I have argued that in fact Plantinga has two mod-
els, and that the PF-rationality of religious unbelief is logically inconsis-
tent with only one of them, the model that includes [P2] and [P4]. But 
neither of these propositions appears likely if theism is true. In fact, 
these formulations seem most unlikely if other aspects of Plantinga's 
epistemology are correct or logically consistent. If these formulations 
were true, Plantinga would lose what has hitherto been an important 
component of his religious epistemology - the parity between basic the-
istic belief and other basic beliefs that are susceptible to defeat and for 
which there can be PF-rational doxastic withholdings. Denying this 
leaves Reformed epistemology quite vulnerable to the charge of fideism. 
Conversely, insulating Reformed epistemology from this charge would 
seem to require that there are circumstances in which religious unbelief 
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can be PF-rational, even if theism is true. Theistic belief is not beyond 
rational appraisal or proper function rationality defeat.'" 
Saint Michael's College 
NOTES 
1. This claim is significantly different from another formulation of the 
proper basicality thesis (also found in Warranted Christian Belief): theistic belief 
held in a basic way is proper function rational or warranted if theism is true. 
Here theistic belief and proper function are not situationally indexed or made 
relative to any set of circumstances. I will discuss the significance of this alter-
native formulation in section IV. 
2. References to Warranted Christian Belief (WCB) will be given parentheti-
cally in the text by chapter. WCBMdndicates that quotations are from 
Plantinga's 1997-98 unpublished manuscripts of WCB. Unfortunately, since 
this paper was completed in advance of the proofs for WCB, I am unable to 
supply page numbers. 
3. The position is externalist since the proper functioning of one's cogni-
tive system is not the sort of thing to which a person has introspective access 
or could come to know just by reflecting on one's mental states. Viewed this 
way warrant entails a kind of externalist rationality. In Plantinga's scheme, 
there are three closely related senses in which a belief can be externally ratio-
nal. A belief is externally rational if it is the product of properly functioning 
cognitive faculties, that is, if there is an absence of cognitive dysfunction, 
impairment, disorder, or pathology in some person's holding B. But a particu-
lar doxastic state might be the product not of malfunction but of properly 
functioning cognitive faculties in some way overridden by certain emotional 
states (e.g., anger, ambition, lust). So a belief can also be externally rational in 
the sense that it was produced by properly functioning cognitive powers not 
impeded, inhibited, or overridden by emotions of a certain type. But external 
rationality is, more narrowly speaking, a matter of a belief being a deliverance 
of one's rational faculties, being produced by properly functioning (and unim-
peded) cognitive faculties successfully aimed at truth. External rationality in 
this third sense is directly connected to warrant. In this paper I refer to it as 
proper function (pr; rationality. A belief will lack warrant if it is PF-irrational, 
and a belief is PF-irrational if it is produced by (i) cognitive malfunction, (ii) 
properly functioning cognitive faculties overridden by certain emotions, or 
(iii) properly functioning cognitive faculties not aimed at the production of 
true beliefs. 
4. In chapter 11 of WeB Plantinga offers two definitions of a defeater. 
According to his preliminary definition: "(D) 0 is a defeater of B for 5 at t iff 
(1) S's noetic structure N (i.e., S's beliefs and experiences and salient relations 
among them) at t includes B, and S comes to believe 0 at t, and (2) any person 
(a) whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly in the relevant respects, 
(b) whose noetic structure is N and includes B, and (c) who comes at t to 
believe 0 but nothing else independent of or stronger than 0 would withhold 
B (or believe it less strongly)." However, Plantinga admits that this definition 
is faulty, for one might have a rationality defeater for some belief B while the 
proper functioning of non-truth aimed cognitive faculties or processes 
requires the holding of B (e.g., for psychological comfort or survival). So 
Plantinga adds the notion of a "purely epistemic defeater" in contrast to a 
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"defeater simpliciter": (D*) D is a purely epistemic defeater of B for S at t iff (1) 
S's noetic structure N at t includes Band S comes to believe D at t, and (2) any 
person S* (a) whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly in the rele-
vant respects, (b) who is such that the bit of the design plan governing the sus-
taining of B in her noetic structure is successfully aimed at truth, (i.e., at the 
maximization of true belief and minimization of false belief) and nothing 
more, (c) whose noetic structure is N and includes B, and (d) who comes to 
believe D but nothing else independent of or stronger than D, would withhold 
B (or believe it less strongly)." In cases where the only processes governing the 
production or sustaining of a belief are truth aimed, a purely epistemic 
defeater will be a defeater simpliciter. I will assume this distinction through-
out. For Plantinga's other discussions on defeaters, see "Naturalism Defeated" 
(December 1994 draft, unpublished) and "Reliabilism, Analyses, and 
Defeaters," Philosophy and Phenomenological [<-esearch 55 (1995), pp. 334-342. 
5. In "Reliabilism, Analyses, and Defeaters," Planting a says that "a 
defeater D for a proposition (for a person S) must be such that it lowers the 
epistemic probability of the prospective defeatee: it must be the case that the 
epistemic probability of the proposed defeatee on the conjunction of D with 
the relevant rest of S's noetic structure is lower than on that relevant rest 
alone" (p. 441). Of course, for Plantinga, the conditional epistemic probability 
of A on B is a matter of the degree to which a rational person will accept A 
given that she also accepts B, reflectively considers A in the light of B, and has 
no other source of warrant for A (or its denial). So whether a person has a 
defeater for some belief really depends on the specifications of the design 
plan. It isn't entirely clear how narrow (or broad) those specifications should 
be, and Planting a formulates no general principles here but merely relies on 
examples that carry with them a good degree of intuitive plausibility. 
Presumably we could formulate general principles from an induction of such 
samples, much like the method Plantinga suggests for determining the criteria 
of proper basicality. I leave that project for another time. 
6. The concept of defeat under consideration here is clearly externalist, 
since it concerns what can rationally be believed in the sense of cognitive 
proper function. So we can speak of such defeaters as external rationality 
defeaters. However, since the reasons that serve to defeat a belief include other 
beliefs of the person, they are the sort of thing to which a person has cognitive 
or introspective access upon reflection. The defeaters, then, are also internalist 
defeaters (perhaps what William Alston refers to under the rubric of perspec-
tival internalism in his" An Internalist Externalism" in Epistemic Justification 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989)). As such, they should be distin-
guished from defeaters construed as merely some external fact about the sub-
ject's environment or cognitive situation that negatively affects the positive 
epistemic status of a person's belief. There is also an important connection 
between defeaters, internalism, and warrant. A person's belief will fail to have 
warrant if it is produced by cognitive faculties that are not functioning prop-
erly, not aimed at truth, or if there is something awry in one's epistemic envi-
ronment. Since these are all design plan specifications to which a person does 
not have introspective access, the kind of defeat they produce is externalist. 
What gets defeated is the warrant a belief has. But if I acquire an internalist 
rationality defeater for my belief that p and the design plan specifies that I 
hold my belief that p less firmly, but I continue to hold it with the same 
degree of firmness, my belief is not externally or PF-rational. So my belief will 
lack warrant for externalist reasons that involve the failure of my cognitive 
system to respond properly to certain internalist conditions, namely the acqui-
sition of some new belief(s). Internalist rationality defeaters, then, (because 
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they defeat what can rationally be believed in the sense of proper function) 
can also be externalist warrant defeaters (though not all warrant defeaters are 
rationality defeaters). This highlights a more general point about internalist 
rationality in relation to warrant. A belief is internally rational just if it is the 
appropriate doxastic response to what is given to a person by way of her pre-
vious beliefs and current experience. Warrant appears to require both internal 
and external rationality. For a discussion on the internalist and externalist con-
tours of Plantinga's rationality defeaters, see my "The Internalist Character 
and Evidentialist Implications of Plantingian Defeaters," The International 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion (forthcoming 1999). 
7. Defeaters often consist of more than one belief. Suppose I believe that 
(p) John cannot swim, and then I learn that (q) John is a lifeguard and I also 
believe (r) all lifeguards can swim. I have a rebutting defeater for my belief 
that p. But it isn't necessarily the case that my continuing to hold p along with 
q is irrational. If I learn that (s) a special class of lifeguards need not be able to 
swim (e.g., perhaps they are spotters) and (t) John has a spotter insignia stick-
er on his car, then I could be PF-rational in continuing to hold p and q. 
Although I continue to hold one of the defeating reasons, the defeating force 
of the defeater (as a whole) has been neutralized by a reason for thinking that 
the other defeating reason (r) is false. This is an example of a defeater being 
defeated. So in [DP] we must say that the kind of defeater that defeats a per-
son's rationally continuing to hold some belief is an undefeated defeater. 
8. See Warrranted Christian Belief, chapter 11; Warrant and Proper Function 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 229-231; and "Reliabilism, 
Analyses, and Defeaters," pp. 336-342. 
9. Given the importance of this example, I offer two quotes from 
Plantinga's own version of the example. "Compare the case of a believer in 
God, who, perhaps through an injudicious reading of Freud, comes to think 
that religious belief generally and theistic belief in particular is almost always 
produced by wish fulfillment. Such beliefs, she now thinks, are not produced 
by cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial environment 
according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth; instead they are pro-
duced by wish fulfillment, which, while indeed it has a function, does not 
have the function of producing true beliefs. Suppose she considers the objec-
tive probability that wish fulfillment, as a belief producing mechanism, is reli-
able. She might quite properly estimate this probability as relatively low; 
alternatively, however, she think the right course, here, is agnosticism; she 
might also be equally agnostic about the probability that a belief should be 
true, given that it is produced by wish fulfillment. But then in either case she 
has a defeater for any belief she takes to be produced by the mechanism in 
question ... .she ... has an undercutting defeater for belief in God; if that 
defeater remains itself undefeated and if she has no other source of evidence, 
then the rational course would be to reject belief in God. That is not say, of 
course, that she would in fact be able to do so; but it remains the rational 
course" (Warrant and Proper Function, pp. 230-231). In WCB Plantinga writes: 
"Projective theories like Freud's could be a defeater for theistic belief (and 
hence for Christianity) for some people. Suppose I believe very firmly that if 
theism is true, there couldn't be any coherent projective theories of religious 
or theistic belief; suppose I also accept theism, though not particularly firmly. 
Now suppose that I then come to believe that (F) Freud's theory (or some 
other projective theory) is indeed coherent. (F) will then be a defeater - per-
haps a partial defeater - for my theistic belief; as long as I accept it and contin-
ue to accept the rest of my noetic structure (including the idea that theism is 
true only if there are no coherent projective theories of theistic belief), I can't 
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rationally accept theism. Of course that idea is false; but a false belief can 
nonetheless serve as a defeater" (chapter 11). 
10. 1 take Plantinga's position here to be a denial of the external rationality 
of religious unbelief, not a denial of its internal rationality. Although internal 
rationality seems to be necessary for PF-rationality and warrant, it is not suffi-
cient. See endnote no. 6 for this distinction. 
11. Although Plantinga does concede that there can be defeaters for theis-
tic belief (in a less than fully rational noetic structure), in chapter 14 he also 
argues that perhaps the problem of evil is not a defeater for theistic belief at 
all. Why? If the sensus divinitatis is damaged, then a person might very well 
come to believe that the existence of God is improbable given the facts of evil 
and fall into agnosticism or atheism. In this situation, though, one cognitive 
module (i.e., the module responsible for probability judgements) is function-
ing properly, but another module (i.e., the sensus divinitatis) is not. However, if 
the two modules are designed to function in tandem, how things go when in 
fact one is not functioning properly is not necessarily a part of the design plan. 
So religious unbelief is more properly viewed as an unintended by-product of 
malfunction in the SD plus proper function elsewhere, but since this need not 
be any part of the design plan, religious unbelief need not be construed as PF-
rational. 
12. Lisa comes to believe that her belief in an imaginary friend while a 
young girl was really due to wish fulfillment. She also thinks that the objective 
probability of beliefs being true if they are produced by wish fulfillment is 
either low or inscrutable. She sees strong analogies between this belief and her 
theistic belief. She becomes convinced that her theistic belief is also the prod-
uct of wish fulfillment and that its objective probability of being true is thus 
either low or inscrutable. Even if Lisa's premises here are false, it doesn't fol-
low that Lisa's holding them is the result of cognitive malfunction. The crucial 
beliefs in Elvis' case are: (A) if there is a God, then God would not permit my 
mother to die unless he had a good reason for doing so and (8) my mother is 
dead and God had no reason for permitting her to die. Perhaps the conse-
quent of (A) is false, or maybe the second conjunct of (8) is false. But why sup-
pose that Elvis' holding these beliefs is the result of cognitive malfunction. 
Maybe he has taken on the testimony of the preacher that (C) God has reasons 
for allowing evil and (D) if God has reasons for allowing evil then he either 
reveals them to us or otherwise consoles us by providing some outward sign. 
Suppose further that Elvis holds the true belief that God has provided neither 
signs nor reasons for allowing the death of Elvis' mother. Even if the preacher 
came to hold these beliefs because of some cognitive disorder, Elvis takes 
them on testimony and they form an essential part of a deductively valid 
argument against the existence of God. And Elvis believes nothing else that 
could neutralize or otherwise defeat the defeater (even though clearly he 
could). 
13. Plantinga mentioned the first analogy in correspondence and intro-
duced the second analogy in response to an earlier draft of this paper present-
ed at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion in San 
Francisco, California, November 22,1997. 
14. There's a closely related problem worth pursuing here that I'll only 
mention in passing. I'm not sure that Plantinga's definition of a defeater in 
chapter 11 of WCB is logically consistent with his claims in chapters 10, 11, 
and 14 that there can be defeaters for theistic belief. His definition (see endnote 
no. 4) requires for D to be a defeater for S's belief B that any person S* who 
holds 8 and comes to believe D (and has the same noetic structure) would 
withhold 8 if S*'s cognitive faculties are functioning properly in tile relevant 
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respects. Since Plantinga permits an irrational belief to serve as a defeater (even 
against a rational belief), he correctly notes that "relevant" proper function 
must be understood to permit cases where the defeater arises from cognitive 
malfunction and serves as irrational input to the defeater system. But 
Plantinga claims that if a person acquires a defeater for theistic belief it is only 
because the sensus divinitatis is not properly functioning, not necessarily 
because of irrational input to the defeater system originating from some other 
malfunctioning faculty. At the very least it is not clear that a malfunctioning 
SCIlSUS divinitatis is consistent with having a defeater for theistic belief. Does 
this not qualify as a relevant cognitive malfunction? A person S may acquire 
some other belief D (the putative defeater), but since any person S* whose 
cognitive faculties are functioning properly in the respects relevant to the 
truth-aimed production and sustenance of theistic belief would not withhold 
B (by virtue of the proper functioning of the sensus divinitatis), D is not a 
defeater against B for S. Thus, either there can be defeaters for theistic belief 
or there cannot. If there cannot be defeaters for theistic belief, Plantinga loses 
his rebutting argument against the charge of fideism. If there are defeaters for 
theistic belief, then (by Plantinga's definition) the design plan makes provi-
sion for withholding theistic belief in some circumstances. But Plantinga's 
account of the sensus divinitatis and his arguments for the irrationality of reli-
gious unbelief imply that the design plan makes no provision for the with-
holding of theistic belief. So it seems like there cannot be defeaters for theistic 
belief after all. Plantinga actually entertains the plausibility of this conclusion 
in chapter 14 of WeB. See endnote no. 11. 
15. I should think that the same thing is true in the case of memory beliefs 
and belief in other minds. Memory beliefs are easy enough. I believe that my 
friends and I had grilled chicken on our camp-out last summer, but then I pull 
out the video and see that in fact we had hamburgers and hotdogs. But now 
think about belief in other minds. Suppose a man is frozen for hundreds of 
years through cryonics. During that time all human persons on earth are grad-
ually replaced by look-alike/ act-alike androids, a process perhaps necessitat-
ed by high levels of cosmic radiation that slowly destroyed the human race. 
When the ice-man thaws he initially holds his belief that there other minds. 
After all, he looks around and everyone looks and acts like humans and he 
has no reason to think otherwise, but he eventually uncovers evidence (in the 
form of videos and written documents spanning over a hundred years or so) 
which provides strong support for the proposition that all humans were even-
tually replaced by these android replicas. No longer believing in the existence 
of other minds, at least human ones, would seem to be PF-rational, even if the 
ice-man is fitted with a module that produces belief in other minds in most 
other circumstances. Neither that module, nor any other, seems to be malfunc-
tioning in this instance. Moreover, it seems that the same sort of conclusion 
would follow if in fact his belief was false (perhaps there are a few last 
humans alive in caves somewhere in Arizona or the whole thing is some hi-
tech, virtual reality experiment performed on the ice-man by the government). 
16. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Academy of Religion on November 22, 1997 in San Francisco, 
California. I am grateful to Alvin Plantinga for his comments on the earlier 
draft and the correspondence that generated the paper. Thanks also to Kelly 
Clark and Linda Zagzebski for helpful comments on the original draft of this 
paper. 
